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ROSALIND DIXON
UPDATING CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
I. Introduction
In the United States, the dominant mode of “updating”
constitutional meaning1 is via a process of judicial interpretation.2
In a smaller subset of cases constitutional meaning is also updated
via “super-statutes” enacted by Congress.3 The virtual impossi-
bility of formal amendment to the Constitution under Article V4
Rosalind Dixon is Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
Author’s note: Thanks to Gregg Bloche, Adam Cox, Richard Epstein, Lee Fennell,
Jake Gersen, Tom Ginsburg, Dennis Hutchinson, Alison LaCroix, Saul Levmore, Anup
Malani, Richard McAdams, Martha Nussbaum, Randy Picker, Eric Posner, Laura Rosen-
bury, Adam Samaha, Lior Strahilevitz, and David Strauss, and other participants in the
University of Chicago Law School Work-in-Progress Luncheon, for helpful discussions
and comments on earlier versions of this and related papers. Thanks to Galina Fomenkova,
Emily Tancer, and David Tanury for outstanding research assistance in relation to the
entire project, and to Peter Mulcahy in relation the issue of constitutional ages. Special
thanks are also due to Richard Holden for helpful discussions and permission to use the
calculations in Part II derived from joint work on constitutional amendment.
1 By updating, I mean to suggest the idea of a constitutional interpreter adopting a new
understanding of a constitutional provision, designed to better accord with contemporary
attitudes and priorities than a prior understanding, but also anchored in some way in some
prior constitutional text, purpose, or practice. Contrast Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional
Amendments and the Common Law, in Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana, eds, The Least
Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 230 (Cambridge, 2006).
Compare also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev
20 (1988). The term, however, is obviously itself one which raises complex problems of
boundary definition.
2 David Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv L Rev 1457, 1487
(2001) (hereafter Irrelevance).
3 William Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215 (2001).
4 See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Sanford Levinson,
ed, Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 237
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is thus deemed by many to be more or less irrelevant.5
A key difficulty with this picture, however, is that it leaves out
of account the degree to which against this background there is a
serious gap in our ability to update, rather than in some cases more
provisionally “work around,”6 core constitutional “rules” as opposed
to “standards.”7 When it considers such rules the Supreme Court
almost always applies a literal as opposed to evolutionary approach
to constitutional interpretation.8 Academic commentators also con-
sistently defend such an approach on the part of the Court, as the
preferred one.9
In the context of constitutional standards, constitutional scholars
make at least four arguments in favor of a present-focused approach
to the interpretation of the Constitution: one based on arguments
from democracy,10 another on concerns about constitutional sta-
bility,11 a third based on the potential for constitutional “learning”
over time,12 and a fourth based on more pragmatic considerations
(Princeton, 1995); Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendment (Working Paper 2010)
(on file with author).
5 Strauss, Irrelevance, 114 Harv L Rev 1457 (cited in note 2).
6 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 Tex L Rev 1499 (2009).
7 On the rules-standards distinction, especially in a doctrinal setting, see, e.g., Kathleen
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22 (1992).
8 No one seriously predicts, for example, that the Court will uphold the recent challenge
to the apportionment of Congress on the basis that (on a functional or evolutionary reading
of US Const, Art I, § 2, cl 3) the current size of the House violates the assumptions of
the Framers about the appropriate ratio of citizens to representatives in Congress: see
Ashby Jones, Does Congress Need More Members? A Lawsuit Says Yes. Lots More, Wall St J
Law Blog (Sept 16, 2009), online at: http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/09/18/should-we-
double-the-size-of-the-house-a-lawsuit-says-yes/. There are, of course, some instances in
which the political branches adopt certain constitutional “workarounds” designed to update
the effective operation of such rules, and for one reason or another, these workarounds
escape judicial consideration: see Tushnet, 87 Tex L Rev 1499 (cited in note 6). However,
in many cases, the validity of such workarounds will ultimately come before the Court
for consideration in a way that does then raise this same problem of constitutional rule
updating.
9 For a defense of this position from a generally conservative, textualist approach to
interpretation, see, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983);
and for the defense of this position by liberal constitutional scholars, see notes 10–12 and
accompanying text.
10 See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const Comm
427 (2007) (hereafter Constitutional Redemption); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 Const Comm 291, 301 (2007) (hereafter Original Meaning); Robert Post and
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv CR-CL L Rev
373 (2007).
11 Post and Siegel, 42 Harv CR-CL L Rev (cited in note 10).
12 David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev 877 (1996)
(hereafter Constitutional Interpretation).
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relating to the need to respond to changing technologies and social
circumstances.13 However, when it comes to constitutional rules,
these same scholars suggest that, because of concerns about “fi-
delity” and also institutional capacity, the literal meaning of the text
of the Constitution should almost always be controlling.14
Yet at the same time, in many cases the literal application of
particular constitutional rules has the potential to impose serious
error costs.15 Not only do changes in social circumstances and un-
derstandings over time mean that, from a contemporary perspective,
a number of core constitutional rules are now no longer optimal.16
Because such rules often prescribe structures or procedures that
affect a variety of substantive legal outcomes, in many cases the
error costs involved are also quite significant.
In part because of this, Congress, state legislatures, and even state
voters have in several instances sought to design new small “c”
constitutional rules aimed at reducing such error costs. In several
contexts, such as those involving the Treaty Clause and congres-
sional-executive agreements, the attempt by Congress to pass such
“updating legislation” has also enjoyed significant success. However,
in other cases, such as Clinton v New York17 and United States Term
Limits Inc. v Thornton,18 similar attempts at legislative updating have
been far less successful. This is in large part because the Supreme
Court has held that, no matter how outmoded they be, the mere
presence of certain rules in the original Constitution by itself blocks
the enactment of such updating legislation.
There is, however, a clear way to address at least part of this
problem: in cases where Congress, state legislatures, or even state
voters seek in good faith to offset the error costs associated with
constitutional rules, the Court should apply an additional margin
of deference to determining the constitutional validity of such ac-
13 Balkin, Original Meaning, 24 Const Comm at 301 (cited in note 10).
14 See Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev at 881 (cited in note 12);
Balkin, Original Meaning, 24 Const Comm at 305 (cited in note 10).
15 The Constitution’s numerical provisions are some of the most extreme instances of
rule-like norms, but other examples of potential ongoing significance also include the
Emoluments Clause, the clause preventing members of Congress holding any other office
(Art I, § 6, cl 2) (including membership in the National Guard), the Natural Born Citizen
Clause (Art II, § 1, cl 5), and the Appointments and Removal Clause (Art II, § 2, cl 2).
16 Contrast William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 UC Davis L Rev 2
(1985).
17 24 US 417 (1998).
18 514 US 779 (1995).
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tion—either by way of an additional margin of avoidance, or by
way of substantive deference on the merits of a constitutional ques-
tion, or both.19
In some cases, where the constitutionality of a measure is clear,
such additional deference will simply serve to confirm the validity
of the measure. In other cases, where there is little plausible con-
stitutional basis for upholding federal or state action under existing
text or precedent, there will also be no capacity to affect the Court’s
decision, but for the opposite reason: the case for constitutional
invalidity was clear. It is thus only in an intermediate category of
case, where there is some real doubt or argument as to constitutional
validity, that such a plus factor would have the potential to be
decisive and therefore lead to a form of “indirect updating” by the
Court. Nonetheless, in a number of important cases, such indirect
updating would have a clear capacity to help address current con-
stitutional error costs.
Objections to constitutional rule updating by the Court will also
have limited force as applied to this kind of indirect, as opposed to
direct, form of constitutional rule updating. Arguments about the
need for fidelity to the text of the Constitution have almost no force
when applied to indirect updating, because the Court under such
an approach is acting in full compliance with the literal requirements
of the text of the Constitution. Concerns about judicial error also
have far less force, because the relevant process of updating involves
a process of cooperation between the Court and legislatures, and
also tends to be far more reversible than direct forms of updating.
The argument develops in four parts. Part II sets out the error
costs associated with core constitutional numerical rules, such as
the two Senators rule and two-thirds majority voting requirement
in the Treaty Clause. Part III considers the ways in which Congress
and state legislatures (and even voters) have arguably attempted to
counter such error costs, and the mixed record of success for such
attempts at constitutional rule updating by legislatures. It also out-
lines the core normative proposal offered by the article, according
to which the Court would apply an additional margin of deference
to attempts by legislatures to update constitutional rules. Part IV
considers objections to constitutional rule updating by the Court,
19 For sympathetic proposals, albeit restricted to the interpretation of Article II of the
Constitution, compare Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Law-
making, 61 U Chi L Rev 123 (1994).
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and shows why such objections have limited applicability to such
indirect, as opposed to direct, modes of constitutional rule updating.
Part V concludes by considering arguments that the error costs
associated with various constitutional rules should instead be ad-
dressed by renewed attempts to rely on a process of constitutional
amendment, either under Article V or otherwise.
II. Constitutional Rules and Error Costs
In noting the literal interpretation given by the Court to
most constitutional rules, constitutional scholars such as David
Strauss suggest that one justification for this approach on the part
of the Court is that for many constitutional rules, it “is more im-
portant that [they] . . . be settled than that they be settled right”
or optimally.20 One potential reason for this is that constitutional
rules may address questions the particular answer to which is rel-
atively unimportant to individuals, both subjectively and as a more
objective matter, considering the welfare and distributive stakes in-
volved.21 Strauss likens this situation to a form of pure “coordination
game,” or cooperative game with multiple equilibria, in which par-
ties are ultimately indifferent between two different strategies, but
the payoff to each is much greater if they can “match” that strategy
with that of another player.22
One of the defining features of constitutional rules is also un-
doubtedly that a number of them do involve a form of pure co-
ordination game. One plausible example of such a provision, which
Strauss points to, is Section I of the Twentieth Amendment, which
sets 12 noon on January 20 as the time at which the President and
Vice-President Elect assume authority under Article II.23 Almost no
one in America seems likely to mind whether the President is in-
augurated on January 19 or 20, or at 12 noon or 1 p.m., but most
Americans will care a great deal about having agreement on what
the relevant date and time are. The opportunities for watching the
inauguration, or selling hotel rooms to those who wish to, seem
likely to be almost precisely the same whether the inauguration is
held on January 19 or 20; whereas if there is uncertainty as to which
20 Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev at 907 (cited in note 12).
21 Id.
22 Id at 910.
23 Strauss, Irrelevance, 114 Harv L Rev at 1487 (cited in note 2).
324 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [2009
date and time apply, there could be a serious constitutional crisis.24
In such cases, there will also be little capacity from a contemporary
perspective for a static or literal reading of constitutional rules to
impose error costs, or losses to social welfare (however defined)
associated with a suboptimal choice of substantive constitutional
norm.25
However, in many instances, constitutional rules help create co-
ordination against a very different background, where parties do
have strong preferences about the substance of particular consti-
tutional norms, or at least about the results they produce. In such
cases, the form of constitutional coordination involved is far closer
to a “battle of the sexes” than a pure coordination game,26 where
parties prefer coordination to noncoordination, but each also prefers
a different basis for coordination.27 (Think of a married couple who
wish to spend the evening together, one of whom wishes to go the
opera, the other to a wrestling match.) There will thus also be far
greater potential for the particular choice of constitutional rules
made by the Framers to involve error costs, when judged from a
contemporary perspective.
Take two core constitutional numerical rules: the two Senators
rule and the requirement in the Treaty Clause that treaties be rat-
ified by two-thirds of the Senate. The application of each rule has
in recent years had major economic and social consequences, and
has created clear “winners” and “losers” on issues which are in fact
highly charged “as a matter of morality or public policy.”28
In recent years, political scientists have shown that there is a
consistent bias in federal spending toward small as opposed to large
states.29 They have also shown that this disparity is almost impos-
24 Id.
25 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J Legal Stud 399 (1973); Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan L Rev 601
(2006–2007).
26 Compare Adam Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 Cardozo L Rev 1295,
1354–63 (2008).
27 Douglas Baird et al, Game Theory and the Law (Harvard, 1994).
28 Contrast Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev at 916–17 (cited in
note 12) (suggesting few Constitutional rules are likely to involve issues that are charged
in this way).
29 In 1995, for example, they have shown that the federal “balance of payments” was
negative in six of the then largest states, but positive in eight out of the 10 smallest states:
see discussion in Lynn A. Baker and Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose
Time Has Come? 13 J L & Pol 21, 41 (1997) (citing KSG study).
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sible to explain other than by reference to the power of Senators
in small states to advance special legislation favoring their state, or
legislation, the benefits of which are expected to exceed the costs
for citizens in that state, but not the nation as a whole.30 The two
Senators rule also plays a critical role in this because, while the
Senate is checked by the House in its capacity to pass such special
interest legislation, there is still a clear, statistically significant overall
correlation between a state’s voting power in Congress and the share
it receives of federal government spending.31
In the context of the Treaty Clause, the requirements it imposes
for successful ratification of a treaty also have major implications
for the likelihood that the United States will ratify treaties of major
public policy significance. Take two major treaties rejected by the
Senate over the last decade: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CNTBT) and the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS).32 The ratification of the CNTBT was rejected by a narrow
majority of the Senate in 1999 (48 votes for, and 51 against, rati-
fication), but many commentators suggest that under an ordinary
majority rule, it would in fact have prevailed, owing to the potential
for increased lobbying efforts by the President.33 The Law of the
Sea Convention, in turn, gained clear supermajority support in the
Senate (49 yea votes as opposed to 30 nays), but failed just short
of the two-thirds supermajority support required for successful rat-
ification. The failure by the Senate to ratify each treaty has also
clearly had major military and economic consequences.
The failure to ratify the CNTBT has, from a military perspective,
30 Id at 41–42. It cannot, for example, be explained by any principled concern to re-
distribute resources from rich to poor states. Another potentially important distributive
consequence of the two Senators rule is that it tends to reduce at least the “descriptive”
or visible representation of minority voters in the Senate: see id at 43–47; Neil Malhotra
and Connor Raso, Racial Representation and the U.S. Senate Apportionment, 88 Soc Sci Q
1038, 1046 (2007).
31 Baker and Dinkin, 13 J L & Pol at 45 (cited in note 29) (reporting a statistically
significant correlation at the 5 percent level). The measure of voting power they use in
this context is the “Per Capita Shapley-Shubik Index.”
32 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Sept 24, 1996, 35 ILM 1443; United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec 10, 1982, 21 ILM 1261. For discussion of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) and U.S. ratification efforts, see Ed-
itorial, The Test Ban Treaty, NY Times A18 (May 25, 2009). For discussion of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and U.S. ratification efforts, see
Michael A. Becker, International Law of the Sea, 43 Intl Law 915, 915–21 (2009).
33 John K. Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a Treaty’s Preratification Pathway: Article
II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement, 31 J Legal Stud S5, S6 (2002).
But see Editorial, Banning the Ban, The Nation (Nov 8, 1999).
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undermined efforts to persuade other nuclear states, such as China,
North Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and Egypt, to
participate in the regime established by the treaty and has thereby
increased the ability of North Korea and India to detonate nuclear
weapons without the fear of effective international sanctions.34 In
a domestic context, it has also strengthened the argument for al-
ternatives to the CNTBT regime, such as proposals for a national
missile defense system, that themselves have cost billions of dollars
and altered the terms of the general foreign policy debate.35 Eco-
nomically, failure to ratify the CNTBT has implied the failure to
reap the full benefits of past expenditures in anticipation of the
CNTBT’s taking effect, such as the United States’ contribution to
a $1 billion International Monitoring System designed to enforce
the CNTBT, and hundreds of millions of dollars of domestic ex-
penditure on a “Stockpile Stewardship” program designed to main-
tain the safety and integrity of the United States’ nuclear arsenal
without the use of nuclear testing.36
As to the Law of the Sea Convention, the failure to ratify the
treaty has been defended as protecting U.S. sovereignty and spe-
cifically the integrity of U.S. military operations under the Prolif-
eration Security Initiative (PSI), which authorizes the U.S. military
to interdict vessels engaged in the traffic of weapons of mass de-
struction.37 Supporters of the Convention, on the other hand, sug-
gest that the United States’ failure to ratify the Convention has
undermined, rather than helped, promote the effectiveness of the
PSI, and also put the United States in a position of strategic weak-
ness in relation to the use of key maritime passages such as in
Indonesia where, without a treaty, it must depend on bilateral con-
sent for use of such passages.38 The economic stakes behind the
34 Editorial, The Test Ban Treaty, NY Times at A18 (cited in note 32).
35 Editorial, Rules of the Game, NY Times A28 (Jan 30, 2009).
36 Associated Press, Bomb “Sniffers” Await Ban Treaty, Newsday A31 (May 24, 2009); On
Target, Finally; The National Ignition Facility, The Economist (U.S. edition) (May 30, 2009).
37 For general discussion of PSI, see Becker, 43 Intl Law at 923–24 (cited in note 32).
For arguments against UNCLOS ratification on U.S. sovereignty grounds, see Editorial,
A Sinkable Treaty, Wall St J A8 (Nov 3, 2007); Frank Gaffney, Jr., Editorial, LOST Justice,
Wash Times A17 (Oct 16, 2007).
38 On UNCLOS ratification strengthening PSI, see Editorial, Unbury This Treaty; The
Senate Can Protect American Interests by Ratifying the Law of the Sea Convention, Wash Post
A18 (Oct 31, 2007); Becker, 43 Intl Law at 923–24 (cited in note 32). For maritime
passage, see James A. Baker and George P. Shultz, Why the “Law of the Sea” Is a Good
Deal, Wall St J A21 (Sept 26, 2007).
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Convention are also high: they include not only the costs associated
with the increased risk of environmental damage to the Arctic with-
out the treaty, but also how major new oil reserves in the Arctic
are divided among nations such as Russia, Denmark, Canada, and
the United States, in relation to which the longer the United States
delays ratifying the treaty, the less likely it is to be able successfully
to claim such reserves without serious opposition from these other
nations.39
Whatever their ultimate view of the two treaties, most commen-
tators therefore agree that, by leading to the defeat of these treaties
as part of U.S. law, the Treaty Clause has not only had some dis-
tributional consequences, but has also decided issues of significant
national importance. In both contexts, demographic changes have
also been sufficiently great since 1789 that, from a contemporary
perspective, the two Senators rule and Treaty Clause now almost
certainly impose literal requirements that are either over- or un-
derinclusive.
In the context of the two Senators rule, increases in population
have occurred at substantially higher rates in large as compared to
small states. (In 1790, for example, the three smallest states in the
union, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Georgia, contained 6 percent
of the national population,40 whereas in 2000, the three smallest
states, Wyoming, Vermont, and Alaska, were home to a mere 0.6
percent of voters.41) This has meant that voters in small states now
have a vastly more disproportionate say in national legislation de-
cision making compared to voters in large states, even when com-
pared to 1790.42 In the Treaty Clause context, the admission of new
states and the increase this has caused in the overall size of the
Senate since 1789 has also been such that, even if one assumes that
the clause was optimal when it was adopted, from a contemporary
39 One estimate is that, under the treaty, the United States would stand to claim an
additional 500,000 square kilometers north of the Arctic Circle as a potential additional
oil reserve: see Trevor Cole, Poles Apart; America’s “We’re Special” Attitude Is Freezing Out
Other Countries—and Big Business—in the Arctic, The Globe and Mail (Canada) 30 (Oct
26, 2007). Others claim that the United States would do even better absent a treaty. See,
e.g., David R. Sands, Treaty Sparks Rivalries; Senate Fight Looms Amid Race to North Pole,
Wash Times A01 (Nov 12, 2007).
40 See U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing: 1790 Census, online at http:
//www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790a-02.pdf.
41 See U.S. Census Bureau, Summary Population and Housing Characteristics Part 1, Table
1: Age and Sex: 2000, online at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/phc-1-1-pt1.pdf.
42 Baker and Dinkin, 13 J L & Pol 21 (cited in note 29).
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perspective, it almost certainly imposes error costs in the direction
of under-ratification of treaties.
The size of a voting body will have the potential to influence the
effective difficulty of obtaining a supermajority in that body for two
interrelated reasons: one having to do with the increase in decision
costs associated with larger decision-making bodies, and the other
with the statistical likelihood that a supermajority of at least quasi-
independent decision makers will favor a particular proposal.43 De-
cision costs alone can take at least two forms: those opportunity
costs implicit in the time taken to debate and vote on a particular
proposal, and those costs associated with the potential for “hold-
up” or a veto by some members of a collective decision-making
body.44 Both forms of decision cost will also tend to increase con-
sistently with any increase in the size of a representative decision-
making body, such as the Senate.45
As I have shown elsewhere with Richard Holden, the law of large
numbers is another reason why, in larger voting bodies, it may be
harder to obtain the supermajority of votes necessary for a particular
proposal, such as a proposal that a particular treaty be ratified.46
Under a supermajority voting rule, the law of large numbers means
that, even absent any change in decision costs, in a large decision-
making body it is far less likely than in a smaller body that there
will be an idiosyncratic draw of preferences or types in favor of
such a proposal.
This can be demonstrated by a simple example involving a series
of coin tosses in which “heads” is treated as a vote in favor of
ratifying a treaty, and “tails” as a vote against ratification. For a
voting body with (say) three or six members, the probability of
successful ratification is 50 percent or 34 percent, respectively,
whereas for a voting body of even 12 or 24, the probability is as
low as 19 percent or 8 percent. For a voting body with 100members,
43 Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden, Designing Constitutional Amendment Rules—to
Scale (paper for University of Chicago Conference on Constitutional Design, 2009), online
at: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/richard.holden/papers/DH.pdf (hereafterDesigning Con-
stitutional Amendment Rules).
44 Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy (Michigan, 1965).
45 Id.
46 Dixon and Holden, Designing Constitutional Amendment Rules (cited in note 43).
8] UPDATING CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 329
FIG. 1.—Functional equivalent over time to a two-thirds majority voting rule in the original
senate (adjusting for increases in senate size).
the probability of successful ratification falls below 1 percent.47
If one makes certain stylized assumptions about voting patterns
on the ratification of treaties (i.e., that (1) the median U.S. voter
is more or less indifferent about whether or not to ratify interna-
tional treaties in the abstract, (2) the views of the median voter in
this context have remained more or less constant over time, and (3)
the views of particular members of the Senate on questions of treaty
ratification are drawn at least semirandomly from the voting pop-
ulation as a whole, relative to that of the median voter) one can in
fact quantify quite concretely the increase this implies over time in
the effective difficulty of treaty ratification under the Treaty Clause.
Figure 1, for example, sets out one calculation of the functional
equivalent to the original trade-off made by the Framers between
what one might call “flexibility” and “rigidity” costs when it came
to adopting the requirement of two-thirds majority support for the
ratification of treaties for progressive changes in the size of the
Senate. (The dotted line shows the “adjusted” supermajority rule
for each change in the size of the Senate, which would maintain
the original functional trade-off made by the Framers between rel-
47 This effect is also quite general and does not depend on the binary nature of outcomes
in the “coin flip” setting. It applies even where there is a continuum of voter preferences
and policy choices: see Richard Holden, Supermajority Rules (Working Paper, 2009), avail-
able online at: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/Richard.holden/papers/index.html.
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evant competing costs, and its shape reflects not only the gradual
“deflation” in the adjusted supermajority rule but also the tie-break-
ing, or integer-rounding, problem created by there being an even
number of Senators at all times. The solid line shows the (third-
order polynomial) trend line in the adjusted supermajority rule over
time.) The potential error costs these calculations imply from a
contemporary perspective are also evident when one considers that
several important treaties rejected by the Senate—including UN-
CLOS—would almost certainly have passed under such an adjusted
supermajority threshold.48
III. Constitutional Rule Updating—by Legislatures
In the face of these error costs, the Supreme Court has (for
good reason, Part IV suggests) taken almost no steps actively to
update various constitutional rules. However, Congress, state leg-
islatures, and indeed even voters have consistently attempted to do
so—and in several cases, enjoyed significant success in the passage
of such updating legislation. The most prominent example of suc-
cessful legislative rule updating of this kind in fact involves the
Treaty Clause itself and the development by Congress of “con-
gressional-executive agreements” as an alternative pathway to in-
ternational lawmaking under Article I.
As the effective difficulty of ratifying treaties under the Treaty
Clause has increased over the last two centuries in the way figure
1 identifies, so too has the use of executive agreements steadily
increased. From the 1890s onward, there has also been a particularly
distinct shift in the use of such agreements relative to the treaty
form in that, since that time, the United States has not only come
to rely more heavily on executive agreements than on treaties;49
48 See U.S. Senate, Rejected Treaties, online at: http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/his-
tory/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#5 (noting 49 votes for, and 30 votes against, ratifi-
cation of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1960—and thus 62 percent supermajority
support for ratification). This, of course, ignores the possibility of strategic voting in the
shadow of such an adjusted rule, both in 1960 and subsequently, but such a concern seems
largely inapplicable in this context: see, e.g., Mike D. Shear, The Trail: The Law of the Sea:
Almost Swimming in Support, Wash Post A4 (Nov 1, 2007) (noting increasing bipartisan
support for the treaty); Setear, 31 J Legal Stud at 6 (cited in note 33) (suggesting that
this and other important treaties would likely have been brought to a successful floor vote
under a lower supermajority rule).
49 Between 1803 and 1838, the ratio of treaties to executive agreements signed by the
United States was roughly 2:1 (60 treaties and 27 executive agreements), and between
1840 and 1888 1:1 (215 treaties and 238 executive agreements), whereas thereafter it was
at least 1:2. See Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States
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Congress has also developed new forms of executive agreement,
based on the model of the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 and Dingley
Tariff Act of 1897, which give the President broad ex ante authority
to negotiate internationally on behalf of the United States.50
Whether coincidental or not, this shift has also occurred in close
parallel to changes in the relationship between the actual super-
majority requirements of the Treaty Clause and the adjusted su-
permajority rule set out in figure 1, given that in the 1890s, the
gap between these two requirements was at its greatest.51
At least one way in which to understand the increasing use of
congressional-executive agreements, as opposed to treaties, over the
last century is, therefore, as a response by Congress to the increasing
error costs associated with the literal requirements of the Treaty
Clause.52 It is also now well settled that the use by Congress and
the President of such congressional-executive agreements is con-
sistent with both Articles I and II of the Constitution, so that there
is little doubt that, if this is the case, Congress has in fact succeeded
in using ordinary legislative means to update constitutional meaning
(i.e., the supermajority voting rule found in Article II).53
In other cases, by contrast, attempts by Congress and other po-
litical actors to pass such updating legislation have met with far less
success—in large part because the Court has been far less willing
to defer to Congress or state legislatures (and voters) in their en-
actment of substitute constitutional rules. Consider one arguable
instance of an attempt by Congress to reduce the practical effect
Senate, a Study Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate by the
Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, S Rep No 106-71 at 39, 106th Cong, 2d
Sess (Jan 2001).
50 For discussion of the effect of the two Acts, see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman and David
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 Harv L Rev 799, 821–26 (1994–95); Oona A. Hath-
away, Treaties’ End: The Past Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the United
States, 117 Yale L J 1236, 1293–94 (2008).
51 Of course, the use of such congressional executive agreements also greatly increased
from the 1930s and 1940s onward, both in the trade context and also much more broadly.
This has led some commentators to argue that the overall shift in international lawmaking
processes, from treaties to congressional-executive agreements, in fact constitutes a distinct
informal Constitutional amendment to the Treaty Clause, which occurred around 1944–45.
See Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 873–900 (cited in note 50).
52 But see id at 873–900 (advancing an entirely different theory of why congressional-
executive agreements have been recognized as valid in the latter part of the twentieth
century, based on a theory of informal Constitutional amendment).
53 For the general acceptance of the interchangeability of treaties and congressional-
executive agreements, see, e.g., Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1239 (cited in note 50); Ackerman
and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 806–08 (cited in note 50).
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of the error costs, from a contemporary perspective, of a core Con-
stitutional rule, namely, the enactment of a presidential line-item
veto as a means of mitigating the effect of a two Senators rule. A
presidential line-item veto clearly does not have an unlimited ca-
pacity to reduce disparities in federal spending between small and
large states54 because it is likely to be used by the President for
these purposes only in those small states that are not competitive
in presidential elections, and even then most likely only in a subset
of those states that vote against the incumbent President.55 How-
ever, at least in this subset of cases it does have the potential to
reduce the fiscal distortion caused by such a rule. Its actual tendency
to do so may also be far from trivial, considering that, on this basis,
every Democratic President since 1960, bar one, could potentially
have vetoed spending measures in Alaska, Idaho, North and South
Dakota, and Wyoming—or five of the twelve smallest states; and
every Republican President since Nixon could have vetoedmeasures
in Hawaii and for the most part also Rhode Island.56
At the same time, for some Justices at least, there is a real question
whether, as a form of purely legislative rule, a line-item veto is
consistent with other constitutional provisions, such as those in
Article I, Section 7 governing the exercise of a presidential veto.
In Clinton v New York,57 a majority of the Court also ultimately
rejected the validity of the line-item veto as inconsistent with the
procedures in Article I, Section 7. In writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens held that there were “important differences between the
President’s ‘return’ of a bill pursuant to Article I § 7, and the exercise
of the President’s cancellation authority pursuant to the Line Item
Veto Act,” including in the timing and comprehensiveness of the
relevant power.58 Stevens noted further that, although the Consti-
tution expressly authorizes the President’s action in the former case,
54 For doubts about the effectiveness of a line-item veto, though mostly as a means of
reducing overall spending, rather than malapportioned spending, see, e.g., Baker and
Dinkin, 13 J L & Pol at 34 (cited in note 29).
55 Exercising the veto in a small state that has voted for the President’s party, while not
directly harming the President’s reelection chances, could still significantly harm the re-
election chances of congressional representatives from the President’s party.
56 Only Presidents Reagan and Nixon, in their second Terms, would not confidently
have used such a veto, given their overwhelming national reelection returns which put
Rhode Island in the Republican column. The exception to the Democratic pattern was
President Johnson, because of his overwhelming victory nationally.
57 524 US 417 (1998).
58 Id at 438–39.
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it is silent in the latter; and given both this history and ordinary
principles of constitutional construction, there were “powerful rea-
sons for construing constitutional silence as equivalent to an express
prohibition.”59
An even starker example of where attempts of this kind at leg-
islative updating have failed involves the Qualifications Clauses, and
the arguable attempt by state voters to offset the increasing length
of congressional tenure allowed by the “deflation” of the age floors
in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2. While it certainly seems plausible
to think that these age requirements were in part designed to ensure
a certain level of maturity or experience on the part of candidates
for office, another presupposition of the Framers may have been
that they would serve to limit the total number of years that rep-
resentative served, on average.60 In the early Republic there was,
for example, a strong norm of voluntary retirement or “rotation in
office.” Life expectancies, even if somewhat higher for elected of-
ficials than the population at large, were also radically lower than
now. (For example, in 1789 one calculation suggests that, condi-
tional on living to age 30, average life expectancy was 60—or 30
years beyond the time at which one could first be elected; whereas
in 2004, the National Vital Statistic Report shows that, conditional
on reaching the ages of 25 or 30, relevant to Qualifications Clauses
in Article I, average life expectancy was 79–80—or 54 to 49 years
beyond the time of first possible election.) The combined result
was that in the decades after the Constitution was first enacted,
average congressional tenure was 2–3 years, whereas now it is more
than 10 years in the House and 12 years in the Senate.
On this reading, the literal requirements of the Qualifications
Clauses have also, progressively, become too low to serve the pur-
poses for which they were enacted. On the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of them, they have also directly blocked the possibility
of renewal by Congress, state legislatures, and state voters of the
relevant eligibility floor.
59 Id at 439 (the relevant principles being those relating to the interpretation of text
reflecting the product of “great debate” and “finely wrought compromises”).
60 See, e.g., Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention 1787 109–11 (Athens,
1966) (noting relationship between debate on the age requirements for the Senate and
debate over term limits). See also Patrick J. Fett and Daniel E. Ponder, Congressional Term
Limits, State Legislative Turnover: A Theory of Change, [1993] PS: Pol Sci & Politics 211
(June 1993); Edward J. Lopez, Congressional Voting on Term Limits, 112 Public Choice 405,
406 (2001); W. Robert Reed and D. Eric Schansberg, The House Under Term Limits: What
Would It Look Like, 76 Soc Sci Q 699, 699–70 (1995).
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In United States v Thornton,61 in considering a state law imposing
term limits on members of Congress, the Court held that the literal
requirements of the Qualifications Clauses not only “fix” the eli-
gibility requirements for Congress vis-a`-vis candidates’ age. It also
held that, according to the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(the specific excludes the general), which was known to the
Framers,62 these requirements exhaust the full range of qualifica-
tions that may legitimately be imposed on members of Congress
so that neither the states nor Congress could seek to increase ro-
tation in electoral office by adding to or “supplementing” those
qualifications.63
The Court applied a similar analysis in Clinton v New York, in
the context of line-item veto legislation. In the treaty context itself,
Professor Larry Tribe has also made cogent arguments, to similar
effect, against recognizing broad scope for Congress under Article
I to pass congressional-executive agreements—thereby bypassing
Article II, Clause 2.64 For legislative attempts to update constitu-
tional rules to succeed consistently, therefore, what is needed, I
argue, is for the Court to afford some additional margin of deference
to such legislation—at least equal in force to this expressio unius
presumption.
In cases where the constitutionality of a measure is clear, such
deference may simply serve to confirm the validity of that measure.
In other cases, where there is little plausible constitutional basis for
upholding federal or state action, under existing text or precedent,
such a plus factor will also have no capacity to affect the Court’s
decision, but for the opposite reason: that the case for constitutional
invalidity is clear (think, here, of Article I congressional-executive
agreements before 1937). Only in an intermediate category of case,
where there is some real doubt or argument as to constitutional
validity, will the constitutional “plus” provided by such a principle
potentially be decisive, and even then it must be weighed with other
61 514 US 779 (1995).
62 Id at 779, 792 n 9. The Court also placed significant reliance on broader historical
arguments, considered in Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969), about the specific
purposes of the Framers in this context. For a critical analysis of this part of the judgment,
see, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Term Limits: History, Democracy and Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 40 NY L Sch L Rev 833 (1996).
63 514 US 779, 797.
64 Lawrence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv L Rev 1221, 1239–45 (1995).
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factors before the Justices can decide how to resolve a particular
case.65
Notwithstanding this, if the Court were to recognize a principle
of indirect updating, this could still be highly significant to the
chances of successful legislative updating by Congress and state
legislatures in the future.66 Historically, there is clear support for
the significance of the Court showing such deference in the context
of the Treaty Clause and congressional-executive agreements, where
both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts level have his-
torically shown what is quite clearly a combination of both delib-
erate constitutional avoidance,67 and also substantive deference on
the merits, when determining the scope of Congress’s authority
under Article I to enact such agreements.68
A further example of the Justices adopting such an approach is
also found in the dissenting judgment of Justice Breyer in Clinton
v New York upholding the constitutionality of a Presidential line-
item veto. Not only, for example, did Justice Breyer in this context
reject arguments based on the formal gap between the literal re-
quirements of Article I, Section 7 and the line item, on the basis
that where “the question is one of literal violation of the law,” the
65 See, e.g., Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 555 (2005) (Kennedy, J) (suggesting that
international practice served merely to “confirm” the Court’s finding that the juvenile
death penalty is unconstitutional); Roper v Simmons, 543 US at 587 (O’Connor, J, dis-
senting) (suggesting that domestic norms were such that no international consensus could
tip the balance toward invalidity); Knight v Florida 528 US 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (suggesting that international consensus was suf-
ficient to tip the balance in favor of a grant of certiorari). In this sense, the deference due
to legislative attempts to update constitutional rules under such an approach will closely
resemble the weight given by the Court in recent cases to evidence of a foreign or in-
ternational legal consensus in a particular constitutional area.
66 Compare Dixon, Working Paper 2010 (cited in note 4). In some cases, of course,
there is also a further question as to how significant Court judgments themselves are to
ultimate constitutional outcomes. See, e.g., debates over the significance of constitutional
judgments such as INS v Chadha concerning legislative vetoes: see Adam Samaha, Low
Stakes (paper prepared for the symposium: The Judiciary and the Popular Will, University
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 2010) (on file with author).
67 In a context such as the Treaty Clause, involving core separation of powers issues,
Constitutional avoidance by courts is particularly valuable because it allows Congress and
the President to adopt new practices that can themselves act as a “gloss” on the meaning
of the text of the Constitution: see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579
(1952) (Frankfurter, J, concurring).
68 For examples of avoidance, see, e.g., Ernest E. Marks Co. v United States, 117 F2d
542, 546 (CCPC 1941); Wislar v United States, 97 F2d 152 (1938), cert denied 305 US
629 (1938). For instances of deference in the application of the nondelegation doctrine
prior to 1944, in the particular context of early congressional-executive agreements as
substitutes for the treaty form: see, e.g., Field v Clark, 143 US 649 (1892); United States
v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 US 304 (1936).
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Court should not seek to parse compliance as a matter of degree;69
he also held that even though the relevant veto power “skirt[ed] a
constitutional edge” when it came to (more functional) separation
of powers and nondelegation principles, it should be afforded an
additional margin of deference as “an experiment that may, or may
not, help representative government work better,”70 thereby im-
plicitly connecting such deference to the desirability of offsetting
some of the disparities in federal spending caused by the two Sen-
ators rule.71 Moreover, no Justice was willing to uphold the relevant
legislation without also endorsing at least some of Justice Breyer’s
reasoning in this context.72
In the future, the likelihood that many cases involving attempts
at legislative rule updating will be “hard” or otherwise evenly bal-
anced also means that, even if some members of the Court are
willing to endorse such a principle, this could significantly increase
the chances that such rules will successfully survive a judicial chal-
lenge.73 In many of these cases, the importance of the issues in-
volved—such as, for example, in the context of the two Senators
rule—will also only add to the overall significance of any such result.
IV. Objections to Updated Constitutional Rules: Direct
versus Indirect Updating
Defenders of the constitutional status quo (in which the
Court adopts an evolutionary approach to constitutional standards
69 524 US 417, 473 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
70 Id at 498.
71 Id at 468–73 (workable government), 498 (representative government).
72 See id at 497 (O’Connor and Scalia, JJ, dissenting (and concurring in part III of
Breyer’s reasoning rejecting automatic application of an expressio unius principle)).
73 Two areas in which such a principle might possibly apply, in addition to those already
mentioned, are, for example, attempts by Congress to reduce the racially disparate impact
of the two Senators rule or to reduce the resource implications, for the federal courts, of
the Twenty Dollars Clause. (On the potential present-day error costs associated with such
rules, see, e.g., Malhotra and Raso, 88 Soc Sci Quarterly at 1046 (cited in note 30); Note,
The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 Harv L Rev 1665 (2004–2005).) In both cases, there is also
a real question as to the scope of Congress’s power under Article I to engage in forms of
legislative rule updating by, for example, attempting to create increased minority repre-
sentation in the House, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), as a partial substitute
for representation in the Senate, or Article I as opposed to Article III courts: see, e.g.,
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder, 129 S Ct 2504, 2508
(2009) (raising doubts about, though not ruling on, the constitutionality of certain pro-
visions of the VRA); Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US
50, 67 (1982) (suggesting clear limits to the scope of Congress’s power to establish Article
I courts beyond cases involving pure public rights).
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but not rules) make two broad arguments against more direct forms
of constitutional rule updating by the Court: one based on a concern
about fidelity by the Justices to the text of the Constitution and the
costs of disrupting settled expectations about the meaning of con-
stitutional rules,74 and a second based on a concern about institu-
tional competence and the capacity for judicial error costs in the
process of updating.75
The first argument is the simplest and most absolute, and turns
on the idea that where the text is relatively “rule-like, concrete and
specific,” notions of interpretive fidelity on the part of the Justices
mean that the text necessarily controls constitutional meaning.76 A
related argument is that if the Court departs from such specific
textual provisions in one case, especially those with high public
salience, it “greatly increase[s] the risk that the [current] valuable
consensus on the text will dissolve generally, increasing the potential
for disruption and for outcomes that are, even to those who dislike
[the substance of the rule], worse still.”77 The costs associated with
disruption of this kind will also tend, so the argument goes, to be
even greater for constitutional rules than standards, because a key
function of constitutional rules is to settle constitutional conflict,
or to provide a “focal point” for various forms of socially valuable
coordination.78
The second argument is also straightforward. It turns on the idea
that in many areas involving constitutional rules, the subject matter
of those rules is such that the Court lacks relevant expertise and
information and therefore may misjudge the capacity of the par-
ticular rule to advance given objectives, or impose other unintended
74 On fidelity, see Balkin, Original Meaning, 24 Const Comm 291 (cited in note 10); and
on the costs of disrupting settled expectations, see Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 401 (cited
in note 25); Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan L Rev at 614–20 (cited in note 25); Strauss,
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev 877 (cited in note 12).
75 Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 401 (cited in note 25); Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan L
Rev at 614–20 (cited in note 25).
76 Balkin, Original Meaning, 24 Const Comm at 305 (cited in note 10). See also Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv
L Rev 1189, 1282–84 (1986–87); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 121–23 (Harvard,
1977) (setting out the idea of “enactment force” as opposed to “gravitational force”).
77 See Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev at 919 (cited in note 12).
78 Id at 910; Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan L Rev at 621–23 (cited in note 25); Richard
H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S
Cal L Rev 209, 240–41 (2009).
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costs.79 Related to this will also be the degree to which, if the Court
does err in a particular context in being willing to engage in a form
of constitutional rule updating, such error costs are likely to be
practically reversible by Congress or state legislatures via ordinary
legislative means.
In many, if not all, situations these arguments together also pro-
vide a powerful case against the desirability of direct updating of
constitutional rules by the Court.80 However, the force of these
arguments simply does not hold when applied to indirect as opposed
to direct modes of constitutional rule updating by the Court.
A decision by the Court to apply additional deference to particular
legislation, under an indirect updating approach, in no way involves
a decision to disregard the text of the Constitution, literally con-
strued. In fact, because it depends for its operation on consideration
of the full range of other constitutional sources that provide support
for the validity of particular legislative action, it encourages careful
attention by the Court to the entire text of the Constitution. Unlike
more direct forms of updating, such an approach therefore raises
neither any real concern about fidelity in particular cases nor, on
slippery-slope grounds, about fidelity to the constitutional text as
a whole.
With respect to fears about judicial error costs, such concerns
will be vastly less applicable to indirect as opposed to direct ap-
proaches to constitutional rule updating. The fact that Congress or
state legislatures have primary responsibility under such an ap-
proach for designing replacement constitutional rules means that,
simply by virtue of the law of large numbers, there is a greater
chance that the relevant rules will be well designed from the outset.81
In some cases, at least, Congress will also have important advantages
over the Court in terms of both internal diversity and access to
relevant information.82 For constitutional procedural rules such as
the Treaty Clause that touch directly on processes internal to Con-
79 On the idea of error costs in the process of Constitutional decision making by the
Court, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4 (1996).
80 As Note, 118 Harv L Rev 1665 (cited in note 73) suggests, one arguable exception
might involve the Twenty Dollars Clause in the Seventh Amendment.
81 Adrian Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason 90 (Oxford, 2008).
82 Id.
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gress, access to such information will also be particularly valuable.83
Even if the Court does in fact err in the process of constitutional
rule updating, under an indirect as opposed to direct approach, there
will be the added safeguard of a much greater chance of Congress
or the states being able to reverse such errors—by ordinary legis-
lative means.
Take a potential decision by the Court to read the word “two”
in Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 in a functional way so as to give
California, New York, and Texas twelve Senators, Wyoming two
Senators, and most other states some number in between (a twelve
Senators rule), and thereby preserve the underlying ratio of large
to small state representation on which the two Senators rule was
based,84 and compare this to (say) the line-item veto as a more
indirect response by Congress to the error costs associated with the
two Senators rule.
Assuming a twelve Senators rule were actually implemented, such
a decision by the Court would be very difficult to reverse.85 The
main reason for this is that, if the Senate were enlarged so as to
give greater representation to large states, Senators who thereby
gained office would likely tend to oppose further rounds of reap-
portionment aimed at reducing the size of the Senate. For such
Senators to support such measures would almost certainly mean
putting their own office at risk, and broader studies of congressional
voting patterns suggest that this means later reapportionment is, at
best, unlikely.86 Another obstacle to reversing such a decision would
83 Evidence of this is arguably the decision by Congress to exempt trade-related inter-
national agreements, but not most other agreements, from the operation of the filibuster:
see, e.g., Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1261 (cited in note 50). Striking in this context is
also the parallel between changes in the requirements for a motion for cloture under
Senate Rule 22, and the adjusted supermajority rule set out in figure 1: see Sarah A. Binder
and Steven S. Smith, Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate (Brookings,
1997).
84 This would preserve the ratio between the population of the largest and smallest three
states in 1789 (as measured by the 1790 census). See notes 40–41.
85 This understanding was, for example, implicit in the attempt by Sen. Dirksen in 1964
to “freeze” the implementation of the Court’s reapportionment decisions: see Robert B.
McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 Mich L Rev 223, 228
(1968–69). For how political dynamics of this kind can lead to the de facto entrenchment
of Constitutional norms or decisions, see Daryl Levinson, Political Commitment, Entrench-
ment, and Self-Enforcement in Constitutional Law, paper presented to University of Chicago
Law School, Law and Politics Workshop, May 13, 2009 (on file with author). On these
informal norms, see Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale
L J 408 (2007).
86 Fett and Ponder, [1993] PS: Pol Sci & Politics 211, 213 (cited in note 60) (showing
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be the potential for collective action problems, given that the po-
tential error costs associated with such a decision (relating to the
quality of Senate deliberation and the distinctiveness of the Senate
relative to the House) would tend to be borne by Americans gen-
erally, rather than by a subset of voters in small or large states or
in one party or another.87
In the context of line-item veto, by contrast, if Congress at any
time came to the view that the line-item veto was not serving its
purpose, it could simply undo the error made by the Court in
upholding it by repealing the relevant statute that authorized it.
The same position would apply in the treaty context if the Senate
came to the view that, as a means of international lawmaking, con-
gressional-executive agreements were being overused relative to the
treaty form. In key areas of national significance such as those in-
volving human rights or multinational security cooperation, even a
minority of Senators could reassert their prior privileges under the
Treaty Clause by use of the filibuster.88 In other contexts, if they
were able to gain a majority in favor of their view, Senators could
also reassert the need to give broader scope to the Treaty Clause
simply by blocking passage of various congressional-executive
agreements. At the level of fidelity, judicial error, and the reversi-
bility of any such errors, there is, therefore, a crucial difference
between indirect and more direct modes of updating when it comes
to objections to the idea of constitutional rule updating by the
Court.
V. Amending versus Updating
For some, any form of constitutional updating by the Court
will nonetheless be ruled out by the fact that Article V, or least
equivalent processes of constitutional amendment, are understood
to provide the exclusive mode of legitimate constitutional updat-
ing.89 In some countries, where the requirements for successful con-
stitutional amendment are less demanding than in theUnited States,
that recently elected members of the House are far more likely to support congressional
term-limit proposals than longer-serving members).
87 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Harvard, 1965).
88 See Hathaway, 117 Yale L J at 1304–05 (cited in note 50).
89 Many though not all scholars in this category are originalists: see, e.g., Raoul Berger,
Originalist Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 Cornell L Rev 350 (1987–88); Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, 1997).
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such a response seems a quite plausible response to the potential
error costs associated with various constitutional rules.
Consider, for example, rules in the Irish and Indian Constitutions
governing the ratification of treaties or the size of government,
which are somewhat parallel to the two-thirds supermajority re-
quirement in the Treaty Clause or two Senators requirement in
Article II. In Ireland, against the backdrop of strong desire for
independence from the United Kingdom, the original 1937 Irish
Constitution affirmed “the inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign
right” of the Irish nation “to determine its relations with other
nations . . . in accordance with its own genius and traditions,” and
the right of the Irish people “to decide all questions of national
policy, according to the requirements of the common good”; it also
specifically provided that “the executive power of the state in or in
connection with its external affairs . . . be exercised by or on the
authority of the [Irish] government.”90 Fifty years on, the Irish Su-
preme Court held that the specificity of these pro-independence
rules was such that, despite significant public support in Ireland for
increased integration with Europe, correctly interpreted these were
a direct bar to Ireland being part of such efforts.91 This did not
mean, however, that such rules ultimately led to any long-term
constitutional error costs in Ireland, because under the relatively
permissive requirements for amendment established by Article 46
of the Irish Constitution, an amendment to these rules designed to
allow ratification of the Single European Act passed comfortably
in the same year that the Irish Court handed down its decision.92
In India, a similar position has applied in the context of consti-
tutional rules such as those governing the size of government. Be-
cause the original Constitution in India contained no explicit pro-
visions regarding the size of the executive, it effectively adopted a
“rule” permitting extremely large cabinets.93 Over subsequent de-
cades this rule proved to involve substantial error costs in terms of
90 Irish Constitution, Arts 1, 5, 29.
91 See, e.g., Crotty v An Taioseach [1987] IR 713 (Walsh, Henchy, Hederman, JJ) (holding
that in unamended form Articles 1, 5, and 29 absolutely prevented Ireland from ratifying
the Single European Act 1986).
92 Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of Ireland (passed by clear legislative majority,
and 70 percent of voters).
93 Constitution of India 1949.
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its effect on the stability of government.94 Legislative measures de-
signed to address this problem also proved largely ineffectual.95
However, because in most instances the constitutional amendment
process under Article 368 of the Indian Constitution requires the
support of only a simple majority of the Indian parliament, the
parliament in 2004 was able to relatively easily pass an amendment
to the Indian Constitution seeking to address these error costs by
establishing a rule limiting the size of national and state govern-
ments to 15 percent of the relevant legislature.96
In the United States, by contrast, the difficulty of formal con-
stitutional amendment under Article V of the Constitution means
that constitutional amendment is a far less realistic response to the
present-day error costs of parallel constitutional rules. The hurdles
imposed by Article V are such that, of 11,000 attempts to amend
the Constitution over the last 200 years, only 27 (at most) have
actually succeeded.97 On most measures, these hurdles mean that,
in global terms, the U.S. Constitution is now either the most or
second most difficult to amend.98 For constitutional rules such as
the two Senators rule, the specific requirements prescribed by Ar-
ticle V are also even more demanding than in respect of other
constitutional norms, because Article V specifically provides “that
no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate.”99
94 Because governments in India are often minority or coalition governments, there is
an inherent tendency for government instability. By creating broad scope for opposition
parties to use cabinet posts as a means of promoting defection by members of the governing
party, the original Constitution also greatly increased this potential for instability. See The
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, Final Report, par 4.19 (2002).
95 See discussion in T. V. R. Shenoy, There Is No Substitute for Vigilance, Rediff India
Abroad (July 9, 2004) (discussing limits to the Anti-Defection Act 1985).
96 Indian Constitution 1969, 91st Amendment. For discussion see Mohan Guruswamy,
91st Constitutional Amendment: Not Quite Adequate, Hindu Business Line (July 20, 2004).
97 See, e.g., John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments,
and Amending Issues, 1789–2002 (ABC-CLIO, 2003).
98 Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment 237 (cited in note 4); Zachary Elkins,
Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge,
2009).
99 This makes amendment of Article 1, Section 3, Clause 1, within the confines of the
Constitution, close to, if not actually, impossible. One possibility, canvassed by Lynn Baker
and Samuel Dinkin (see 13 J L & Pol 21, cited in note 29), is that Article V could be
amended in order to remove this requirement of unanimous consent, but such an argument
encounters severe difficulties in how it treats the relationship between the general and
specific requirements of a particular constitutional clause: see Sanford Levinson, The Po-
litical Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 Const Comm 107 (1996).
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For both the two Senators rule and the Treaty Clause, political
realities further mean that, even if these formal legal hurdles to
amendment did not exist, it would still be extremely difficult to rely
on Article V in order to amend these rules. As Baker and Dinkin
argue in the context of Article I, Section 3, Clause 1, “any state
that currently receives disproportionately great representation in
the Senate relative to its share of the nation’s population benefits
from the existing allocation of representation and therefore should
have little interest in changing it,” and “the number of such over-
represented states has always exceeded the one-third-plus-one nec-
essary to block the mere proposal of any constitutional amend-
ment.”100 Accordingly, it also follows that Senators from small states
will be extremely unlikely to support any amendment which might
make it easier to amend Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 and especially
one as broad as an amendment to Article V itself.101
This same argument holds for use of Article V to amend the
Treaty Clause. Why, one might ask, would two-thirds of Senators,
other than in the most exceptional cases, vote to remove the right
of two-thirds of Senators to decide whether or not to ratify a treaty?
As Edwin Corwin suggested in 1940 in criticizing the Treaty Clause,
there seems not “the least likelihood that . . . two thirds of the
Senate [will] consent to relax that body’s powers” especially in an
area of such potential significance.102 I have shown elsewhere that
because it contains the same two-thirds supermajority requirement
for congressional approval as the Treaty Clause, Article V is itself
one of the most prominent examples of a constitutional rule that,
from a contemporary perspective, likely involves error costs.103 For
either the two Senators rule or the Treaty Clause to be successfully
amended, the only realistic route for proponents of such change
will therefore be informal amendment to the Constitution, other
than via Article V, where these problems of endogeneity may be
less severe.
Bruce Ackerman, in developing what it is perhaps the leading
account of informal amendment in the United States, identifies two
100 Baker and Dinkin, 13 J L & Pol at 71 (cited in note 29).
101 Id at 72.
102 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers: History and Analysis of Practice
and Opinion 232–40 (NYU, 1940). The events of 1945 support this interpretation: see
Ackerman and Golove, 108 Harv L Rev at 889–90 (cited in note 50).
103 See Dixon Working Paper 2010 (cited in note 4).
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instances of large-scale constitutional change outside Article V,
namely, the Reconstruction Amendments and the New Deal ex-
pansion in federal regulatory power.104 From these “constitutional
moments,” Ackerman concludes that informal constitutional change
can occur in the United States where three conditions are met: (1)
there is a proposal for small “c” constitutional change; (2) there is
a “triggering election,” in which that proposal or analogs to it are
centrally at issue; and (3) there is subsequent legislative “ratification”
of the proposal by Congress.105 Ackerman therefore posits that,
while the House and Senate certainly have a central role to play in
the process of constitutional change, that role will tend to turn on
the outcome of ordinary, and not supermajority, voting procedures.
This means that informal amendments will tend both to overcome
the current small state veto over amendment and also, to a large
degree, be as likely in a Congress of today’s size as in 1789.106
At the same time, as a solution to the problem of constitutional
rule updating, the difficulty with such a process of informal amend-
ment is at least twofold. The first is that many scholars do not
acknowledge that such processes exist. Instead, many favor the view
that while such constitutional moments clearly involved major con-
stitutional change and were legitimate as a matter of political prin-
ciple, they occurred almost wholly outside the terms of the Con-
stitution or involved extraconstitutional, not constitutional,
processes of change.107 The second, related difficulty is that, at least
as initially formulated, Ackerman’s theory implies extremely infre-
quent scope for constitutional updating—indeed, it points to
amendment at an even slower rate than under Article V.108 The
more Ackerman has been willing to expand his theory to identify
further constitutional moments,109 the more difficult it has also be-
come to delineate such moments from more ordinary moments of
104 Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol 1, Foundations (Belknap, 1993).
105 Id.
106 On the relative stability of a 50 percent majority rule, see Dixon and Holden, De-
signing Constitutional Amendment Rules (cited in note 43).
107 See, e.g., David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in Sanford Levinson, ed,
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 117 (Prince-
ton, 1995). See also Tribe, 108 Harv L Rev at 1286–88 (cited in note 64).
108 For criticisms of Ackerman’s theory as underinclusive in this context, see, e.g., Mi-
chael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 Const Comm 115 (1994).
109 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L
J 1013 (1983–84).
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constitutional contestation, or “dialogue,” in which the Court sees
itself as having a central role to play in deciding whether and to
what degree constitutional change occurs.
Other proposals designed to overcome the difficulty of formal
constitutional amendment under Article V also encounter difficul-
ties when applied to many constitutional rules. One proposal, by
Akhil Amar, is that Americans should be free to amend the Con-
stitution via a national referendum process.110 Whatever its general
merits, the difficulty with this proposal as applied to most consti-
tutional rules is that it assumes a degree of popular interest in
proposed amendment that simply will not exist in the case of many
specific, technical constitutional provisions, such as the Treaty
Clause or even the two Senators rule.111
A second proposal I have developed elsewhere is that the Court
should give some degree of positive force to proposed and failed,
as well as successful, constitutional amendments, according to the
degree of support they receive in Congress and state legislatures.112
By enlisting Congress, rather than voters, as the initiator of con-
stitutional change under Article V, my approach is also clearly less
sensitive than Amar’s to the need for popular interest in the error
costs associated with specific constitutional rules. By adjusting the
level of deference enjoyed by congressional or state legislation to
the degree of support a proposed amendment enjoys in Congress
and state legislatures, my proposal also encounters some of this
same difficulty, albeit in less acute form.
No matter how one conceives of applying or redesigning the
constitutional amendment process, therefore, it is almost inevitable
that an insistence on reliance on such processes as a means of con-
stitutional updating will be simply to endorse, rather than address,
the current deficit regarding the updating of constitutional rules.
If one takes seriously, as many proponents of amendment exclusivity
do, this deficit and its effects in areas such as federal spending,113
it may therefore be that for the foreseeable future indirect consti-
110 See Akhil Amar, Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V,
94 Colum L Rev 457 (1994).
111 For other criticisms of Amar’s proposal, see Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Con-
stitution, 56 NYU L Rev 353 (1981).
112 Rosalind Dixon, Working Paper 2010 (cited in note 4).
113 For criticism by Constitutional conservatives of decisions such as Clinton v New York
and Thornton, see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive:
Presidential Power from Washington to Bush (Yale, 2008).
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tutional rule updating is the option which for constitutional con-
servatives, as well as liberals, is actually the least worst of the avail-
able alternatives.
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